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Abstract—Peer-to-peer (P2P) botnets have become one of the
major threats in network security for serving as the infrastruc-
ture that responsible for various of cyber-crimes. Though a few
existing work claimed to detect traditional botnets effectively,
the problem of detecting P2P botnets involves more challenges.
In this paper, we present PeerHunter, a community behavior
analysis based method, which is capable of detecting botnets
that communicate via a P2P structure. PeerHunter starts from
a P2P hosts detection component. Then, it uses mutual contacts
as the main feature to cluster bots into communities. Finally, it
uses community behavior analysis to detect potential botnet com-
munities and further identify bot candidates. Through extensive
experiments with real and simulated network traces, PeerHunter
can achieve very high detection rate and low false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
A botnet is a set of compromised machines controlled by
botmaster through a command and control (C&C) channel.
Botnets may have different communication architectures. Clas-
sical botnets were known to use a centralized architecture,
which has a single point of failure. Peer-to-peer (P2P) network
happens to be modeled as a distributed architecture, where
even though a certain number of peers fail to function properly,
the whole network is not compromised. In this case, the most
of recent botnets (e.g. Storm, Waledac, ZeroAccess, Sality and
Kelihos) attempt to build on P2P network, and P2P botnets
have proven to be highly resilient even after a certain number
of bots being identified or taken-down [1]. P2P botnets provide
a fundamental infrastructure for various cyber-crimes [2], such
as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), email spam, click
fraud, etc. Therefore, detecting P2P botnets effectively is rather
important for cyber security.
However, designing an effective P2P botnets detection sys-
tem is extremely hard, due to several challenges. First, botnets
tend to act stealthily [3] and spend most of their time in the
waiting stage before actually performing any malicious activ-
ities [4], [5]. Second, botnets tend to encrypt C&C channels,
which makes deep-packet-inspection (DPI) based methods fail
to work. Third, botnets can randomize their communication
patterns dynamically without jeopardizing any primary func-
tions [6]–[8], which makes statistical traffic signatures based
methods unable to work.
In this paper, we propose PeerHunter, a novel community
behavior analysis based P2P botnet detection system, which
could address all the challenges above. We consider a botnet
community as a group of compromised machines that commu-
nicate with each other or connect to the botmaster through the
same C&C channel, are controlled by the same attacker, and
aim to perform similar malicious activities. Due to the dynamic
changes of communication behaviors of P2P botnets [9], it
would be extremely hard to identify a single bot. However,
bots within the same P2P botnet always work together as
a community, thus, have distinct community behaviors to be
identified. PeerHunter begins with a general P2P hosts detec-
tion component. Then, it builds a mutual contact graph (MCG)
of the detected P2P hosts. Afterwards, it applies a community
detection method on the MCG, which uses mutual contacts
[10] as the main feature of P2P botnets to cluster bots within
the same botnet together, and separate bots and legitimate
hosts or different types of bots into different communities.
Finally, it uses destination diversity and mutual contacts
as the natural features to capture the “P2P behavior” and
“botnet behavior” respectively of each P2P botnet community,
and further identify all the P2P botnets.
Specifically, PeerHunter is capable of detecting P2P bots
with the following challenges and assumptions: (a) botnets
are in their waiting stage, which means there is no clear
malicious activity can be observed [4]; (b) the C&C channel
has been encrypted, so that no deep-packet-inspection (DPI)
can be deployed; (c) no bot-blacklist or “seeds” information
[10] are available; (d) none statistical traffic patterns [9] known
in advance; and (e) could be deployed at network boundary
(e.g. gateway), thus, do not require to monitor individual host.
In the experiments, we mixed a real network dataset from
a public traffic archive [11] with several P2P botnet datasets
and legitimate P2P network datasets [12]. To make the exper-
imental evaluation as unbiased and challenging as possible,
we propose a network traces sampling and mixing method to
generate synthetic data. We tested our system with 24 synthetic
experimental datasets that each contains 10,000 internal hosts.
We implemented our P2P hosts detection component using a
Map-Reduce framework, which could dramatically reduce the
number of hosts subject to analysis by 99.03% and retained all
the P2P hosts in our experiments. The Map-Reduce design and
implementation of our system could be deployed on popular
cloud-computing platforms (e.g. amazon EC2), which ensures
the scalability of our system to deal with a big data. With the
best parameter settings, our system achieved 100% detection
rate with none false positives.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section II presents
the related works. Section III explains the motivation and
details of the features applied in our system. Section IV
describes the system design and implementation details about
PeerHunter. Section V presents the experimental evaluation of
PeerHunter. Section VI makes the conclusion.978-1-5090-5569-2/17/$31.00 c©2017 IEEE
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II. RELATED WORK
A few methods attempt to detect P2P botnets have been
proposed [3], [5], [7]–[10], [12]–[18]. Host-level methods
have been proposed [17]. However, in host-level methods, all
the hosts are required to be monitored individually, which
is impractical in real network environments. Network-level
methods can be roughly divided into (a) traffic signature based
methods, and (b) group/community behavior based methods.
Traffic signature based methods [3], [5], [7], [8], [12], [14]–
[16] rely on a variety of statistical traffic signatures. For
instance, Entelecheia [5] uses traffic signatures to identify a
group of P2P bots in a super-flow graph. PeerRush [12] is a
signature based P2P traffic categorization system, which can
distinguish traffic from different P2P applications, including
P2P botnet. Nevertheless, these methods suffer from botnets
that have dynamic statistical traffic patterns. Traffic size sta-
tistical features can be randomized or modified, since they are
only based on the communication protocol design of a botnet.
Traffic temporal statistical features can also act dynamically
without jeopardizing any primary functions of a botnet.
Group or community behavior based methods [9], [10]
consider the behavior patterns of a group of bots within the
same P2P botnet community. For instance, Coskun et al. [10]
developed a P2P botnets detection approach that start from
building a mutual contact graph of the whole network, then
attempt to utilize “seeds” (known bots) to identify the rest of
bots within the same botnet. However, most of the time, it
is hard to have a “seed” in advance. Yan et al. [9] proposed
a group-level behavior analysis based P2P botnets detection
method. However, they only considered to use statistical traffic
features to cluster P2P hosts, which is subject to P2P botnets
that have dynamic or randomized traffic patterns. Besides, their
method cannot cope with unknown P2P botnets, which is the
common case in botnet detection [2], because of relying on
supervised classification methods (e.g. SVM).
III. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
To demonstrate the features discussed in this section, we
conducted some preliminary experiments using dataset shown
in Table III and Table IV.Table I shows the notations and
descriptions, and Table II shows the measurements of features.
TABLE I: Notations and Descriptions
Notations Descriptions
MNF the management network flows
AVGDD the average # of distinct /16 MNF dstIP prefixes
AVGDDR the average destination diversity ratio
AVGMC the average # of mutual contacts between a pair of hosts
AVGMCR the average mutual contact ratio
A. P2P Network Characteristics
Due to the decentralized nature of P2P network, a P2P
host usually communicates with peers that distributed in
a large range of distinct physical networks, which results
in the destination diversity (DD) characteristic [12] of P2P
management network flow (MNFs). MNF is the network flow
for maintaining the function and structure of the P2P network.
TABLE II: Measurements of Features
Trace AVGDD AVGDDR AVGMC AVGMCR
eMule 8,349 17.6% 3,380 3.7%
FrostWire 11,420 15.2% 7,134 4.5%
uTorrent 17,160 8.7% 13,888 3.5%
Vuze 12,983 10.1% 18,850 7.9%
Storm 7,760 25.1% 14,684 30.2%
Waledac 6,038 46.0% 7,099 37.0%
Sality 9,803 9.5% 72,495 53.2%
Kelihos 305 97.4% 310 98.2%
ZeroAccess 246 96.9% 254 100.0%
Host A
Host B
Host C
Host D
Host E
Host 1
Host 2
Host 3
Host 4
Host 5
Network Boundary
Internal Network
External Network
(a)
Host A
Host B
Host C
Host D
Host E
(b)
Fig. 1: Illustration of network (a) and its mutual contact graph (b).
The P2P network flow mentioned in this section and the rest
only refers to P2P MNF.
We use DD as our main feature to detect P2P network flows
and further identify P2P hosts. In addition, we use the number
of distinct /16 IP prefixes of each host’s network flows, rather
than BGP prefix used in [3] to approximate DD feature of each
P2P host/network flow. /16 IP prefix is a good approximation
of network boundaries. For instance, it is very likely that
two IP addresses with different /16 IP prefixes belong to two
distinct physical networks. This is also supported by Table II,
which shows the network flows in a P2P network spreading
across a large number of distinct physical networks according
to the number of /16 IP prefixes.
B. Mutual Contacts
The mutual contacts (MC) between a pair of hosts is a set
of shared contacts between the corresponding pair of hosts.
Consider the network illustrated in Fig. 1a which contains an
internal network (Host A, B, C, D and E) and an external
network (Host 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). A link between a pair of
hosts means they have at least one connection. In Fig. 1a,
Host 1, 2 are the mutual contacts shared by Host A, B.
Mutual contacts is the natural characteristic of P2P botnet.
Compared with legitimate hosts, a pair of bots within the same
P2P botnet has a much higher probability to share a mutual
contact [10]. Because bots within the same P2P botnet tend
to receive or search for the same C&C messages from the
same set of botmasters (peers) [19]. Moreover, in order to
prevent peers from churning in a P2P botnet, botmaster has
to check each bot periodically, which results in a convergence
of contacts among peers within the same botnet [3]. However,
since bots from different botnets are controlled by different
botmasters, they won’t share many mutual contacts. Legitimate
host pairs may have a small set of mutual contacts, since nearly
all hosts communicate with several extremely popular servers,
such as google.com, facebook.com [10]. Furthermore, the host
pairs running the same P2P applications may also result in a
decent ratio of mutual contacts, if they are accessing the same
resource from the same set of peers by coincidence. However,
in reality, legitimate P2P hosts with different purposes will
not search for the same set of peers. Thus, we can use mutual
contacts as a feature to cluster the bots within the same botnet.
The basic idea is to build a mutual contacts graph (MCG)
as shown in Fig. 1, where Host A, B are linked together in
Fig. 1b, since they have mutual contacts Host 1, 2 in Fig. 1a.
Similarly, Host C, D, E are linked to each other in Fig. 1b,
since every pair of them share at least one mutual contacts in
Fig. 1a. More details about MCG is discussed in Section IV-B.
C. Community Behavior Analysis
We consider three types of community behaviors: (a) flow
statistical feature, (b) numerical community feature and (c)
structural community feature.
1) Flow Statistical Feature: Botnet detection methods us-
ing flow statistical features, have been widely discussed [7],
[8], [20], [21]. We use the statistical features of P2P MNFs,
which are usually generated through the same P2P protocol
for a specific P2P application, and some of the statistical
patterns of P2P MNFs fully depend on protocols. However, the
other network flows, such as data-transfer flows, are usually
situation-dependant, which vary a lot even in the same P2P
network. In this work, we use the ingoing and outgoing bytes-
per-packets (BPP) of network flows in one P2P network as the
community flow statistical feature.
2) Numerical Community Feature: We consider two types
of features: average destination diversity ratio (AVGDDR) and
average mutual contacts ratio (AVGMCR).
Average Destination Diversity Ratio: This captures the
“P2P behavior” of P2P botnet communities. The destination
diversity (DD) of a P2P host is the number of distinct /16 IP
prefixes of each host’s network flows. The destination diversity
ratio (DDR) of each host is its DD divided by the total number
of distinct destination IPs of its network flows.
Due to the decentralized nature of P2P networks, P2P
network flows tend to have higher DDR than non-P2P network
flows. Furthermore, network flows from P2P botnet commu-
nities usually have higher average DDR (AVGDDR) than
network flows from legitimate network communities. Network
flows from bots within the same botnet tend to have similar
DDR, since those bots are usually controlled by machines,
rather than humans. However, the destinations of legitimate
P2P network flows are usually user-dependant, which result
in their DDR varying greatly from user to user. Besides, our
botnet community detection method aims to cluster bots within
the same botnets together, rather than clustering the same
legitimate P2P hosts together. Legitimate communities might
contain both P2P hosts and non-P2P hosts, leading to lower
AVGDDR than botnet communities.
Table II shows the number of distinct destination IP /16
prefixes in MNFs of each type of P2P host, where both
legitimate hosts and bots spread across a large number of
distinct networks. However, most of the botnets communities
have higher AVGDDR than legitimate communities, except
Sality. We could combine the next feature to identify Sality.
Average Mutual Contacts Ratio: This captures the “botnet
behavior” of P2P botnet communities. The mutual contacts
ratio (MCR) between a pair of hosts is the number of mutual
contacts between them, divided by the number of total distinct
contacts of them. This idea is based on three observations:
(a) P2P botnet communities are usually formed by at least
two bots, otherwise they cannot act as a group, (b) MCR
between a pair of bots within the same botnet is much higher
than that between a pair of legitimate hosts or bots from
different botnets, and (c) each pair of bots within the same
botnet has similar MCR. Thus, we consider the average MCR
(AVGMCR) among all pairs of hosts within one network
community as another numerical community feature.
Table II shows the average number of mutual contacts
between a pair of hosts within the same community, where
both botnets and certain legitimate network communities have
a considerable number of mutual contacts. That is because
those legitimate communities have much more contacts than
botnets. However, botnets has much higher AVGMCR.
3) Structural Community Feature: This captures the struc-
tural characteristics of a botnet. The basic idea is that, every
pair of bots within the same botnet tends to have a considerable
number or ratio of mutual contacts. Therefore, if we consider
each hosts as a vertex and link an edge between a pair of hosts
if they have a certain amount or ratio of mutual contacts, the
bots within the same botnet tend to form certain complete
graphes (cliques). On the contrary, the contacts of different
legitimate hosts usually tend to diverge into different physical
networks. Thus, the probability that legitimate communities
form certain cliques is relatively low. Then, we can consider
P2P botnets detection as a clique detection problem, which de-
tects cliques from a given network with certain requirements.
However, since clique detection problem is NP-complete, we
cannot just apply such method to detect botnets. Therefore,
we use all three botnet community behaviors.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
PeerHunter has three components, that work synergistically
to (a) detect P2P hosts, (b) construct mutual contact graph, and
(c) detect bots. Fig. 2 illustrates the framework of PeerHunter.
A. P2P Hosts Detection
This component is responsible for detecting hosts engaged
in P2P communications. The input is a 5-tuple network flow
[ipsrc, ipdst, proto, bppout, bppin], where ipsrc is source IP,
ipdst is destination IP, proto is tcp or udp, and bppout and
bppin are outgoing and ingoing BPP of network flows. First,
we cluster all network flows F = {f1, f2, . . . , fk} based on the
4-tuple [ipsrc, proto, bppout, bppin] into flow clusters FC =
{FC1, FC2, . . . , FCm}. Then, we calculate the number of
distinct /16 prefixes of ipdst (destination diversity) associated
with each flow cluster, ddi = DD(FCi). If ddi is greater than
a pre-defined threshold Θdd, we consider FCi as a P2P MNF
cluster, and the corresponding source hosts as P2P hosts.
Network Traffic
P2P Hosts 
Detection
Community 
Detection
Mutual Contact 
Graph Extraction
Botnet Communities 
Detection
Bot Candidates 
Detection
Report
P2P Botnet Detection
Fig. 2: System Overview
Algorithm 1 P2P Hosts Detection
1: function MAP([ipsrc, ipdst, proto, bppout, bppin])
2: Key ← [ipsrc, proto, bppout, bppin]
3: V alue← ipdst
4: output (Key, V alue)
5: end function
6: function REDUCE(Key, V alue[ ])
7: k ← Key
8: ddk = Ø
9: for v ∈ V alue[ ] do
10: ddk ← ddk ∪ {v}
11: end for
12: if |ddk| ≥ Θdd then
13: for v ∈ V alue[ ] do
14: output (k, v)
15: end for
16: end if
17: end function
As shown in Algorithm 1, we design this component using
a MapReduce framework [22]. For a mapper, the input is a set
of 5-tuple network flows, and the output is a set of key-value
pairs. For a reducer, the input is the set of key-values pairs.
Then, the reducer aggregates all values with the same key to
calculate the DD of each flow cluster, and finally output the
detected P2P MNFs based on Θdd.
B. Mutual Contact Graph Extraction
This component is responsible for extracting mutual contact
graph (MCG) through mutual contacts. The input is a list
of detected P2P hosts, H={h1, h2, . . ., h|H|} , and their
corresponding P2P MNFs, F={f11 , f12 , . . ., f1n1 , f21 , f22 , . . .,
f2n2 , . . ., f
|H|
1 , f
|H|
2 , . . ., f
|H|
n|H|}, where f ji is flow i from
hj . The output is a MCG, Gmc = (V,E), where each vertex
vi ∈ V contains a DDR score ddri of hi’s MNFs, and each
edge eij ∈ E contains a nonnegative MCR weight mcrij
between hi and hj . Algorithm 2 shows the main steps in this
component.
First, for each host hi, we generate a contact set Ci, that
contains all the destination IPs in its MNFs. Each host hi also
contains a flow statistical pattern set Si, which contains all
[proto, bppout, bppin] 3-tuple in its MNFs. Let DD(Ci) be
the set of distinct /16 prefixes of all the IPs in Ci. Then, ddri
and mcrij can be calculated as below.
ddri =
‖DD(Ci)‖
‖Ci‖ mcrij =
Ci ∩ Cj
Ci ∪ Cj (1)
Furthermore, as discussed in Section III-C1, MNFs from
different hosts within the same network communities should
have similar statistical patterns. Thus, for each pair of input
hosts, say hi and hj , we calculate the intersection between Si
and Sj . If Si ∩Sj = Ø, then there is no edge between hi and
hj in MCG. Otherwise, they share at least one MNF statistical
pattern, and we calculate mcrij as shown in (1). Let Θmcr be
a pre-defined threshold. Then, if mcrij > θmcr, there is an
edge between hi and hj , with weight mcrij . Otherwise, there
is no edge between hi and hj (mcrij = 0).
Algorithm 2 Mutual Contact Graph Extraction
input: H , F , Θmcr
output: Gmc = (V,E)
1: E = Ø, V = Ø
2: for hi ∈ H do
3: Ci = Ø
4: Si = Ø
5: end for
6: for f ji ∈ F do
7: Cj ← Cj ∪ {ipdst}
8: Sj ← Sj ∪ {[proto, bppout, bppin]}
9: end for
10: for hi ∈ H do
11: ddri ← ‖DD(Ci)‖‖Ci‖
12: vertex vi ←< ddri >
13: V ← V ∪ {vi}
14: end for
15: for ∀ hi, hj ∈ H and i < j do
16: if Si ∩ Sj 6= Ø then
17: mcrij ← Ci∩CjCi∪Cj .
18: if mcrij > Θmcr then
19: edge eij ←< mcrij >
20: E ← E ∪ {eij}
21: end if
22: end if
23: end for
24: return Gmc = (V,E)
C. P2P Botnet Detection
This component is responsible for detecting P2P bots from
given MCG. First, we cluster bots into communities. Then,
we detect botnet communities using numerical community
behavior analysis. In the end, we perform structural commu-
nity behavior analysis to further identify or verify each bot
candidates. Algorithm 3 shows the main steps.
1) Community Detection: In a MCG Gmc = (V,E), ∀
eij ∈ E, we have mcrij ∈ [0, 1], where mcrij = 1 means
all contacts of hi and hj are mutual contacts and mcrij = 0
means there is no mutual contacts between hi and hj . Fur-
thermore, bots within the same botnet tend to have a large
number/ratio of mutual contacts. Then, the bots clustering
problem can be considered as a classical community detection
problem. Various community detection methods have been
discussed in [23]. In this work, we utilize Louvain method,
a modularity-based community detection algorithm [24], due
to (a) its definition of a good community detection result
(high density of weighted edges inside communities and low
density of weighted edges between communities) is perfect-
suited for our P2P botnet community detection problem; (b)
it outperforms many other modularity methods in terms of
computation time [24]; and (c) it can handle large network
data sets (e.g. the analysis of a typical network of 2 million
nodes only takes 2 minutes [24]).
Given Gmc = (V,E) as input, Louvain method outputs
a set of communities Com = {com1, com2, . . . , com|Com|},
where comi = (Vcomi , Ecomi). Vcomi is a set of hosts in
comi. Ecomi is a set of edges, where ∀ ejk ∈ Ecomi , we have
ejk ∈ E and vj , vk ∈ Vcomi .
2) Botnet Communities Detection: Given a set of commu-
nities Com, for each community comi ∈ Com, we start from
calculating avgddri and avgmcri, as shown below.
avgddri =
∑
vj∈Vcomi ddrj
‖Vcomi‖
(2)
avgmcri =
2×∑∀ejk∈Ecomi mcrjk
‖Vcomi‖ × (‖Vcomi‖ − 1)
(3)
We define two thresholds Θavgddr and Θavgmcr. Then,
∀ comi ∈ Com, if avgddri ≥ Θavgddr and avgmcri ≥
Θavgmcr, we consider comi as a botnet community.
3) Bot Candidates Detection: Recall from Section III-C3,
the MCG of a botnet usually has a structure of one or several
cliques. Therefore, we utilize a maximum clique detection
method CliqueDetection to further identify or verify each
bot candidates from botnet communities. Each time it tries to
detect one or several maximum cliques on the given MCG
of botnet communities. If maximum clique (at least contains
3 vertices) has been found, we consider the hosts in that
clique as bot candidates, remove those hosts from the original
MCG, and run the maximum clique detection algorithm on the
remaining MCG, until no more qualified maximum cliques to
be found, then return the set of bot candidates.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
1) Experiment Environment: The experiments are con-
ducted on one single PC with an 8 core Intel i7-4770 Pro-
cessor, 32GB RAM, 400GB SSD and 4TB HHD, and on the
64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 LTS operating system.
2) Data Collection and Analysis Tool: The dataset contains
three categories: (a) ordinary P2P network traces, (b) P2P
botnets network traces, and (c) background network traces. In
practice, all the network traces could be collected at a network
boundary (e.g. firewall, gateway, etc.).
Ordinary P2P network traces (D1): We used the dataset
obtained from the University of Georgia [12] as our ordinary
P2P network traces, which collected the network traces of 4
different popular P2P applications for several weeks. There are
16 eMule hosts, 16 FrostWire hosts, 14 uTorrent hosts and 14
Algorithm 3 P2P Botnet Detection
input: Gmc, Θavgddr, Θavgmcr
output: Sbot
1: SbotnetCom = Ø, Sbot = Ø
2: Com← Louvain(Gmc)
3: for comi ∈ Com do
4: avgddri ←
∑
vj∈Vcomi
ddrj
‖Vcomi‖
5: avgmcri ←
2×
∑
∀ejk∈Ecomi
mcrjk
‖Vcomi‖×(‖Vcomi‖−1)
6: if avgddri ≥ Θavgddr and avgmcri ≥ Θavgmcr then
7: SbotnetCom ← SbotnetCom ∪ {comi}
8: end if
9: end for
10: for comi ∈ SbotnetCom do
11: Sbot ← CliqueDetection(comi)
12: end for
13: return Sbot
TABLE III: Traces of Ordinary P2P Networks (24 hrs)
Trace # of hosts # of flows # of dstIP Size
eMule 16 4,181,845 725,367 42.1G
FrostWire 16 4,479,969 922,000 11.9G
uTorrent 14 10,774,924 2,326,626 57.1G
Vuze 14 7,577,039 1,208,372 20.3G
TABLE IV: Traces of P2P Botnets (24 hrs)
Trace # of bots # of flows # of dstIP Size
Storm 13 8,603,399 145,967 5.1G
Waledac 3 1,109,508 29,972 1.1G
Sality 5 5,599,440 177,594 1.5G
Kelihos 8 122,182 944 343.9M
ZeroAccess 8 709,299 277 75.2M
TABLE V: Traces of Background Network
Date Dur # of hosts # of flows Size
2014/12/10 24 hrs 48,607,304 407,523,221 788.7G
Vuze hosts, and we randomly selected 24 hours network traces
of each host. More details about D1 are shown in Table III.
P2P Botnet network traces (D2): Part of our botnet
network traces is also from the University of Georgia dataset
[12], which contains 24 hours network traces of 13 hosts in-
fected with Storm and 3 hosts infected with Waledac. We also
collected 24 hours network traces of another three infamous
P2P botnets, Sality, Kelihos and ZeroAccess. These network
traces were collected from the hosts intentionally infected by
Kelihos, ZeroAccess, and Sality binary samples obtained from
[25]. Furthermore, all malicious activities have been blocked
with the same settings as shown in [12]. We collected the
network traces of 8 Kelihos bots, 8 ZeroAccess bots and 5
Sality bots. More details about D2 are shown in Table IV.
Background network traces (D3): We used the dataset
downloaded from the MAWI Working Group Traffic Archive
[11] as background network traces, as shown in Table V.
This dataset contains 24 hours anonymized network traces
at the transit link of WIDE (150Mbps) to the upstream ISP
on 2014/12/10 (sample point F). This network traces contains
approximate 407,523,221 flows and 48,607,304 unique IPs.
79.3% flows are TCP flows and the rest are UDP flows. We
TABLE VI: Summaries of Experimental Datasets (EDs)
Descriptions Values
the # of EDs 24
the # of bots in each ED 37
the # of ordinary P2P hosts in each ED 60
the # of internal hosts in each ED 10,000
the AVG # of external hosts in each ED 6,607,714
the AVG # of flows in each ED 91,240,099
the duration of each ED 24 hr
utilize ARGUS [26] to process and cluster network traces into
the 5-tuple format tcp/udp flows.
3) Experimental Dataset Generation: To evaluate our ap-
proach, we generate 24 experimental datasets by mixing the
network traces from D1 and D2 into different sub-datasets
of D3. Table VI illustrates the summaries of experimental
datasets (EDs). Each experimental datasets contains 10,000
internal hosts sampled from D3, where the network traces
of 37 randomly selected hosts are mixed with D2, and the
network traces of another 60 randomly selected hosts are
mixed with D1. To make the experimental evaluation as
unbiased and challenging as possible, below we propose two
criterions.
Maintain a bipartite network structure. Our system
aims to deploy at a network boundary (e.g. firewall, gateway,
etc.), where the network forms a bipartite structure, and only
network flows within the connections between internal hosts
and external hosts could be captured. Then, the network in
each experimental dataset should maintain a bipartite network
structure, where any pair of internal hosts should not have any
communications to each other.
Keep the connectedness of mutual contacts graph. The
easiest way to obtain a list of background hosts is to sample
the hosts randomly from D3, with the respect of bipartite
structure. However, since D3 contains an extremely large
number of hosts, simply sampling hosts randomly will result
in that most of the sampled background hosts do not have
a mutual contact with the other background hosts, which is
much easier for PeerHunter to identify botnet communities.
Because less number of mutual contacts among legitimate
hosts means more disconnected legitimate communities in the
corresponding MCG, which is in favor of Louvain method to
detect strongly connected botnet communities. Therefore, we
need to sample a list of internal hosts in a way that every
internal host should have at least one mutual contact with at
least one another internal host.
To follow the criterions described above without making
our evaluation tasks any easier, we propose the following
experimental dataset generation procedure:
• Utilize a two-coloring approach to sample the network
traces of 10,000 background hosts from D3 without jeopar-
dize the bipartite network structure and the connectedness of
mutual contacts graph: (a) initialize two counters, Cblack and
Cwhite, to count the number of hosts colored in black and
white respectively; (b) coloring a random host hi as black,
and Cblack plus one; (c) coloring all contacts of hi as white,
and increase Cwhite by the number of hosts colored as white
in this round; (d) for each new colored host, color its contacts
TABLE VII: Detection Rate and False Positive Rate For Different θdd
θdd DR FP θdd DR FP
2-10 97/97 ≥ 450/9,903 500-1,000 81/97 0
15 97/97 ≥ 8/9,903 5,000 60/97 0
20-25 97/97 ≤ 1/9,903 10,000 18/97 0
30-185 97/97 0 12,500 5/97 0
200 89/97 0 13,500 0 0
TABLE VIII: Community Detection Results For Different Θmcr
Θmcr FLCR FBCR FBSR
0-0.25 0 0 0
0.5 0 0 2.8
1.0 0 0 6.4
with the opposite color, and adjust the counters repeatedly,
until we have Cblack ≥ 10, 000 and Cwhite ≥ 10, 000; (e)
select the colored host set with exactly 10,000 hosts as the
internal hosts, the hosts in the other colored host set will be the
external hosts; and (f) extract the network traces of the 10,000
internal hosts from D3. Then, it forms a bipartite graph, where
each colored host set forms a bipartite component, and each
host shares at least one mutual contacts with some other hosts
from its own bipartite component.
• To maintain a bipartite network structure of botnets and
ordinary P2P network traces, we eliminate all communications
among bots in D2 and legitimate P2P hosts in D1.
• To mix D1 and D2 with D3, each time we randomly
select 97 internal hosts from one sub-datasets sampled from
D3, map those IPs to 37 bots’ IP in D2 and 60 legitimate P2P
hosts’ IP in D1, and merge the corresponding network traces.
To evaluate our system, 24 synthetic experimental datasets
have been created by running this procedure repeatedly.
B. Evaluation on P2P Host Detection
We evaluate the P2P host detection with different parameter
settings. This component uses a pre-defined threshold θdd
(Section IV-A) to detect P2P hosts. We applied this component
on all 24 experimental datasets, and Table VII shows the
experimental results with different θdd, ranging from 2 to
13500. If θdd is set too small, non-P2P hosts are likely to be
detected as P2P hosts, which results in many false positives.
For instance, when 2 ≤ θdd ≤ 10, there are, on average more
than 450 non-P2P hosts have been falsely identified as P2P
hosts. In contrast, if θdd is set too large, all P2P hosts will
be removed, which results in false negatives. For instance,
when θdd = 5000, there are, on average 37 P2P hosts have
been falsely discarded, and when θdd ≥ 12000, nearly all
hosts are removed. When 20 ≤ θdd ≤ 185, it detects all P2P
hosts with a very small number of false positives (≤ 1/9903),
which demonstrates that our P2P hosts detection component
is stable and effective over a large range of θdd settings. The
effectiveness of θdd is also subject to the time window of the
collected data. In our experiment, we used 24 hrs network
traces. The destination diversity (DD) of P2P hosts tends to
grow over time. Then, θdd will be effective in a even larger
range, if the time window increase.
C. Evaluation on Community Detection
We evaluate the performance of community detection with
different parameter settings. We applied this component on the
remain network flows (24 experimental datasets) after the P2P
host detection (with θdd = 50). For each experimental dataset,
this component generates a MCG Gmc = (V,E) with a pre-
defined threshold Θmcr, where each edge eij ∈ E contains a
weight mcrij ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we applied Louvain method (with
default resolution 1.0) on the MCG for community detection.
The choice of Θmcr has an influence on the community
detection results.
We evaluated the community detection performance in terms
of (a) the ability to separate bots and legitimate hosts, (b)
the ability to separate bots from different botnets, and (c) the
ability to cluster bots within the same botnet. Let falsely-
clustered hosts denote the number of legitimate hosts that
have been clustered with bots into the same community, cross-
community bots denote the number of bots of different
types that have been clustered into the same community, and
split-communities botnets denote the number of detected
communities that contain bots, subtract the number of ground
truth botnets (e.g. 5 in our experiments). Then, we propose
three evaluation criterions: (a) False Legitimate Cluster Rate
(FLCR), which is falsely-clustered hosts divided by the
total number of legitimate hosts during community detec-
tion; (b) False Bot Cluster Rate (FBCR), which is cross-
community bots divided by the total number of bots during
community detection; (c) False Botnet Split Rate (FBSR),
which is split-communities botnets divided by the total
number of ground truth botnets.
Table VIII shows the results with different Θmcr, ranging
from 0 to 1. If Θmcr is set too small, there will be more
non-zero weight edges, which might result in less but larger
communities. In contrast, if Θmcr is set too large, most of
the vertices will be isolated, which results in more but small
communities. As shown in Table VIII, when Θmcr ≤ 0.25,
FBSR also remains 0, which means no botnets have been
falsely split into different communities. However, as Θmcr
increasing from 0.5 to 1, FBSR is also increasing, which
means bots within the same botnets have been clustered into
different communities. This reflects that most of the MCG
edge weighs between bots are less than 0.5. If Θmcr ≥ 0.5,
bots even within the same botnets will be isolated. FLCR and
FBCR are always 0 no matter how Θmcr has been changed.
FLCR is 0 means that all bots are successfully separated from
legitimate hosts. FBCR is 0 means none of the communities
contains more than one type of bots. This results demonstrate
that our system is very effective and robust in separating bots
and legitimate hosts, and separating different types of bots.
D. Evaluation on Botnet Detection
We evaluate the botnet detection component with different
parameter settings. We applied this component on the remain
network flows (24 experimental datasets) after previous two
components (with θdd = 50 and Θmcr = 0.03125). Table IX
shows the results with different θavgddr ∈ [0, 1] and θavgmcr ∈
[0, 1]. The results support our idea that the AVGDDR of
legitimate host communities is lower than most of the P2P
botnets. For instance, the AVGDDR of all (60/60) legitimate
TABLE IX: DR and FPR For Different θavgddr and θavgmcr
θavgddr
θavgmcr - 0-0.0625 0.125 0.25 0.5 1
0-0.03125 DR 37/37 32/37 32/37 16/37 0/37FP 60/60 32/60 0/60 0/60 0/60
0.0625-0.25 DR 37/37 32/37 32/37 16/37 0/37FP 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60
0.5 DR 21/37 16/37 16/37 16/37 0/37FP 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60
1 DR 0/37 0/37 0/37 0/37 0/37FP 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60 0/60
host communities are less than 0.25, but the AVGDDR of
32 out of 37 botnets are higher than 0.25. The missing ones
turned out to be 5 Sality bots, which could be detected by
AVGMCR. As shown in Table IX, legitimate P2P hosts have
lower AVGMCR than P2P bots (e.g. θavgmcr = 0.0625).
This experimental results demonstrate that our botnet detection
component is effective (detection rate equals to 100 % with
zero false positives) and stable over a large range of θavgddr
(e.g. [0, 0.0625]) and θavgmcr (e.g. [0.0625, 0.25]).
E. Evaluation on PeerHunter
We evaluate our system according to effectiveness and
scalability. Effectiveness is to evaluate the capability of our
systems to detect P2P botnets, and scalability is to evaluate
the practicality of our systems to deal with the real world
big data. We applied PeerHunter on 24 experimental synthetic
datasets, with θdd=50, Θmcr=0.03125, θavgddr=0.0625 and
θavgmcr=0.25, and all results are averaged over 24 datasets.
We use detection rate and false positive rate to measure the
effectiveness. As shown in Table X, our system identified all
97 P2P hosts from 10,000 hosts, and detected all 37 bots from
those 97 P2P hosts, with zero false positives. It is clear that
PeerHunter is effective and accurate in detecting P2P botnets.
Our system has a scalable design based on efficient detec-
tion algorithm and distributed/parallelized computation. Out
of three components in our system, the P2P botnet detection
component (community detection and botnet detection as
shown in Table X) has a negligible processing time compared
with the other two components. This is due to previous two
components are designed to reduce a huge amount of the hosts
subject to analysis (e.g. 99.03% in our experiments). The P2P
host detection component has linear time complexity, since
it scans all the input flows only once to compute the flow
clusters and further identify P2P flows. However, since it is
the very first component to process the input data, which could
be large, it still costs the highest processing time (as shown in
Table X). To accommodate the growth of a real world input
data (big data), we designed and implemented the P2P host
detection component using a Map-Reduce framework, which
could be deployed in distributed fashion on scalable cloud-
computing platforms (e.g. amazon EC2). The MCG extraction
component requires pairwise comparison to calculate edges
weights. Let n be the number of hosts subject to analysis
and m be the maximum number of distinct contacts of a
host. We implemented the comparison between each pair of
hosts parallelly to handle the growth of n. If we denote k as
the number of threads running parallelly, the time complexity
TABLE X: Number of hosts identified by each component
- Before P2P detection After P2P detection After Community detection After Bot detection
# of hosts 10,000 97 97 37
TABLE XI: PeerHunter Execution Time
- P2P Host Detection MCG Extraction Community Detection Bot Detection Total
Processing Time 15 minutes 5 minutes 18 milliseconds 11 milliseconds 20 minutes
of MCG extraction is O(n
2m
k ). For a given ISP network, m
grows over time. Since our system uses a fixed time window
(24 hours), for a given ISP network, m tends to be stable
and would not cause a scalability issue. Besides, since the
percentage of P2P hosts of an ISP network is relatively small
(e.g. 3% [3]), and an ISP network usually has less than 65,536
(/16 subnet) hosts, n would be negligible compared with m.
Furthermore, even if n and m are both big numbers, our
system could use an as large as possible k to adapt the scale
of n and m. In a nutshell, PeerHunter is scalable to handle
the real world big data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a novel community behavior
analysis based P2P botnet detection system, PeerHunter, which
operates under several challenges: (a) botnets are in their
waiting stage; (b) the C&C channel has been encrypted; (c)
no bot-blacklist or “seeds” are available; (d) none statistical
traffic patterns known in advance; and (e) do not require to
monitor individual host. We propose three types of community
behaviors that can be utilized to detect P2P botnets effectively.
In the experimental evaluation, we propose a network traces
sampling and mixing method to make the experiments as un-
biased and challenging as possible. Experiments and analysis
have been conducted to show the effectiveness and scalability
of our system. With the best parameter settings, our system
can achieved 100% detection rate with none false positives.
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